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This is not an essay about tolerance as an end in itself; nor does it search for ways to 
extend the current model of tolerance in the post-industrial world. Rather, this essay 
explores the implosion of tolerance politically in the United States, how in the name of 
tolerance, according to Herbert Marcuse, “its most effective manifestations serv[e] the 
cause of oppression,”1 and the ways that tolerance can regain its (potentially) progressive 
nature. This essay attempts to uncover the promise of tolerance in order to create the 
theoretical and physical space needed for honest and progressive dissent to flourish and 
function amongst a democratic polity jaded by the failed promises of Western Liberalism. 
For Marcuse, “it was the openness to alternatives proffered by a broadly practiced 
and non-repressive tolerance which was a precondition of freedom and veri-si-mi-litude.”2 
If non-repressive, tolerance becomes the “precondition of freedom;” however, as this article 
develops, by connecting tolerance to economic freedom and State power, tolerance emerges 
as a system of perpetual repression. As evident as the State may desire it to seem, tolerance 
as a political tool does not unequivocally lead to inclusive policies, but rather, in the 
modern American context, allows the political machinery to pursue policies of war and 
torture that essentially ignore the plight of the average citizen domestically and 
internationally, in the name of protecting and maintaining American, liberal values. Herbert 
Marcuse’s essay “Repressive Tolerance” creates a glimpse into a democratic polity capable 
of realizing utopic principles, yet essentially shutout by the very principle that should lead 
the way. While historically tolerance led to more inclusive social principles, culturally it 
continues to define the dichotomy of “us vs. them” necessary politically for a country to 
carry on a subversive war that, until recently, was not only tolerated by the American 
citizenry, but applauded.3 In order to break loose from oppressive behavior and regain the 
truly liberating and radical dimension of tolerance, we must, as Marcuse suggests, excavate 
through a system “which fosters tolerance as a means for perpetuating the struggle for 
existence and suppressing the alternatives.”4 Only then can American society regain its 
footing and ability to operate within an oppositional system that seeks to transform the 
repressive policies of modern, liberal tolerance into a new understanding of tolerance that 
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leads to a more inclusive and humane society. As Marcuse advocates, agents trapped within 
a repressive model of tolerance must respond repressively in order to establish a new 
understanding of tolerance that leads to a more inclusive, progressive and humane society. 
 
Identifying the Problem: The Interchangeability of Liberalism and Tolerance 
Grasping the bureaucratic manifestation of a tolerance that functionally seeks to 
include all in the broadest sense, Marcuse’s analysis of repression and tolerance demands 
that we re-engage principle understandings of these terms in a liberal polity. In modern, 
political constructions, liberalism and tolerance become interchangeable, one producing the 
condition for the other, and vice versa. While this interchangeability suggests a strong, 
progressive understanding of freedom – a self-sacrificial denial of absolute, sovereign 
authority and freedom – pragmatic fears for actual, non-coerced cooperation and 
moderation push the individual into the protection of societies, derived not from self-
moderating freedom, but from the interchangeability of liberalism (economic and 
individual liberty) and tolerance. While the exact tenets of liberalism can be debated, this 
paper uses John Locke’s broad, dualistic liberal model: freedom of conscience or thinking 
and economic freedom.5 In Louis Hartz’s analysis of America’s liberal tradition, the birth 
and growth of American politics occurred according to Locke’s understanding of a liberal 
consensus without ever experiencing  
“‘a liberal movement’ or a real ‘liberty party’ in America: we have only had the  
American Way of Life, a nationalist articulation of Locke which usually does not 
know that Locke himself is involved […] here is a doctrine which everywhere in the 
West has been a glorious symbol of individual liberty, yet in America its 
compulsive power has been so great that it has posed a threat to liberty itself.”6 
This narrowing of the political landscape is nothing new in Lockean liberalism where a real 
seed of conformity and control exists.  
In the liberal world, according to Locke, individuals elect to leave the state of nature 
and enter political society to secure certain freedoms. In the state of the nature, the natural 
liberty of the individual “is to be free from any Superior Power on Earth, and not to be 
under the Will or Legislative Authority of Man, but to have only the Law of Nature for his 
rule.”7 While this law of nature produces ultimate freedom, it also eliminates all methods of 
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social control beyond mutual cooperation or violence. As Thomas Hobbes more strongly 
argues, without a common power to maintain the law of nature, “every man is Enemy of 
every man.”8 While Locke understands this threat in terms softer than Hobbes’s state of 
perpetual war, he still recognizes a need for self-preservation, not unadulterated freedom. 
For Locke, this urge inevitably emerges and reorders life from within the state of nature – 
fear and the need for self-preservation functionally nudge the individual away from pure 
freedom and into the realm of obedience. While obedient to a consented-to sovereign, in 
Locke’s ideal-liberal model, this is not a strict moment of absolute submission, but a 
progressive and constructive step in securing and maintaining liberty.  
In order to emerge from the state of nature while retaining a memory or sense of 
freedom, political society requires both a creative step and a coherent moment of consent  
in which the individual transitions from the state of nature into a recognizable political 
State. In creating political society, the “Sword is not given the Magistrate for his good 
alone,” Locke writes, but for the “Preservation of every Man’s Rights and Property, by 
preserving him from the Violence or Injury of others.”9 In this moment, the individual 
performs two simultaneous acts: relinquishing claims to sovereignty and choosing to 
tolerate both external control and equalized rights to liberal freedom. By consenting to an 
external authority, the individual produces tolerance by transforming natural freedom into 
political liberty, guaranteed by laws and social rights.  
As a central ordering principle of liberalism, tolerance seems to illustrate a 
permanent desire to maintain a cohesive political unit and protect individual claims to 
freedom. However, as the impact of liberalism grew and became more intertwined with 
capitalism, tolerance provided an avenue for repression.10 By limiting the extent of 
individual freedom, liberal polities produced a new form of tolerance that expects 
individual acceptance and subservience, a process that results in both inclusionary and 
exclusionary practices. To not tolerate means to produce another category; the intolerable 
who in physical manifestations often become an external other used to protect liberal 
values. Historically, this condition of repressive tolerance emerged distinct from the 
progressive tolerance “consented to” at the moment of political consent. While the latter 
describes tolerance as the recognition of an external authority consented to in order to 
protect subjective and economic freedom, the former suggests that liberal tolerance 
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becomes a philosophical and political tool used to cement State power and justify the 
consequences of liberal-capitalism: economic disparity, environmental destruction, 
hierarchical political and social structures, etc, etc.11 At the subjective level, Marcuse, in a 
study on authority, envisions an irreconcilable duality that helps structure liberal tolerance: 
“the authority relationship […] assures two essential elements in the mental attitude of he 
who is subject to authority: a certain measure of freedom (voluntariness: recognition and 
affirmation of the bearer of authority, which is not based solely on coercion) and 
conversely, submission, the tying of will (indeed of thought and reason) to the authoritative 
will of an Other.”12 This duality helps elucidate the ways in which subjective repression 
and external, environmental (natural, political, social, and cultural) destruction can be 
overlooked in liberal polities due to a narrowing of individual freedom, i.e. economic and 
personal liberty secured by an external State.  
While Locke argues for liberty, he also argues for social control and manipulation 
through education/socialization, imagining “the minds of children as easily turned this or 
that way as water itself.”13 This type of control illustrates that equality in the liberal sense 
means only equal access to individual and economic freedom; the State exists to protect this 
right, but seemingly does not exist to help realize economic and personal freedom at the 
subjective level. By elevating the protection of rights, tolerance becomes a means for 
extending State power as long as that power appears, in its action and functioning, to 
protect the liberal values of freedom. In this specific manifestation, liberal tolerance 
absolutely ignores the production of socioeconomic hierarchies and systems of entrenched 
power that naturally arise in capitalist-organized societies. Tolerance, as a perceived model 
of inclusion, structures the hierarchical relationship that in turn defines the extent and limits 
of tolerance. 
During the 2010 Presidential State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama 
further problematized this conceptualization of liberal tolerance. In shifting from an 
international to domestic perspective, Obama states, “We find unity in our incredible 
diversity, drawing on the promise enshrined in our Constitution: the notion that we are all 
created equal, that no matter who you are or what you look like, if you abide by the law you 
should be protected by it; that if you adhere to our common values you should be treated no 
different than anyone else.”14 While Obama issued this phrase in relation to greater civil 
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rights and liberties, the comment reveals the potential for repressive tolerance to emerge as 
the operational ethos of liberalism. The quote explicitly establishes an “us vs. them” 
mentality, an essentialism that states if you follow “our common values” and “our” laws, 
then your identity is recognized and tolerated. However, what if you fall outside these 
definitions? What happens when tolerance, as defined here, functions within a liberal 
context, where celebrated values begin and end with individual and economic liberty? Once 
tolerance and economic freedom become permanently linked, the potential for abuses of 
power emerges, and the establishment of hierarchical structures socially, culturally and 
politically begins to become evident. Such a connection dictates tolerance according to 
economic participation and thus suggests that challenges cannot, nor should not, be 
tolerated.  
When we consider this dictum in relation to the Lockean model of consensual 
governance, the State, specifically in the Western context, becomes the judge for those who 
fall within its protection. If economic activity and access become the liberal goals, the State 
protects economic interests by regulating those who do not “adhere to our common values.” 
By categorizing those who belong and do not belong within the liberal polity, the State 
assumes pure sovereign absolutism capable of mandating levels and extensions of 
tolerance. Beginning with Carl Schmitt’s sovereign authority and extending to more 
modern conceptions of a biopolitical state that regulates claims to inclusion and life, 
theorists such as Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben and Judith Butler 
recognize the consequences: once the State assumes sovereign control, it maintains itself 
and the values it strives to protect through violence and exclusion – the State assumes full 
power to dictate political inclusion and political exclusion.15  
For example, Agamben argues that during moments of exception or emergency, the 
sovereign authority may deny legitimate claims for protection and rights if, as Obama 
suggests, those individuals challenge the values and legal systems of the State.16 Benjamin 
goes a step further, arguing that “the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of 
emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule” because, in this analysis, the 
State operates according to the volatility and challenges posed by the hyper-valuation of 
economic freedom.17  If liberalism and tolerance truly become interchangeable, then the 
State functions absolutely to repress challenges and maintain the virility of capitalist 
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enterprises that may, and often do, include exploitation. This potentiality, for Herbert 
Marcuse, allows tolerance to become a philosophical approach and pragmatic method for 
(violently) repressing challenges to national values in order to maintain individual, 
capitalistic growth. Given this potential, Marcuse investigates the following question: if 
tolerance leads to systems of repression and avenues for pursuing unlimited State power 
(and violence), should the individual seek to resist or repress all repressive systems of 
tolerance? 
 
Developing a Solution: Herbert Marcuse and the One-Dimensional Society 
Marcuse thus emerges at this critical juncture to offer a critique of the equivocation of 
liberalism and tolerance. By linking individual and economic liberty with tolerance, tolerance 
loses its potential for progressive equality and freedom, serving rather to cement liberal values 
and the State that exists to protect it. In a broader application, Marcuse’s work represents a 
radical reply to the stifling conditions of a post-WWII era he labeled “one-dimensional.”18 
From ideas of play-based Eros to calls for political activism and engagement, Marcuse 
discerned a historical moment that, in vying for completion, functionally separated the 
individual from the aspects of living that should matter. The post-industrial society of the mid-
20th century achieved a rare ability to produce enough goods and sustenance for everyone – a 
post-scarcity world. However, rather than seek out new alternatives, the liberal-capitalist model 
sought to finalize this position of permanent producers and consumers, a new organizational 
ethos, as William Whyte foresaw, which bound the individual to a redundant and circulatory 
position: work to get more, get more by continually working.19  
In Marcuse’s analysis, society in the post-industrial age perpetuates its own existence 
rather than cultivating the individual experience; the emphasis changes from how society 
betters the individual to how the individual functions for, and is defined by, the external 
system. In order to cement this emphasis, the one-dimensional society substitutes personal 
needs with repressive needs in which the individual, according to Marcuse comes to “love and 
hate what others love and hate […] [these needs] continue to be what they were from the 
beginning – products of a society whose dominant interest demands repression.”20 Obscured 
behind the myth of liberty and affluence, society limits the individual according to technical 
rationality; the social system defines and dominates the conceptualization of self-worth and 
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personal ability. Societal productiveness signals individual worth and value. Consequently the 
individual loses Eros, substituting the pleasure principle with the reality principle, which for 
Marcuse “implies the subjugation and diversion of the destructive force of instinctual 
gratification, of its incompatibility with the established societal norms and relations, and, by 
that token, implies the trans-substantiation of pleasure itself.”21 Affectively defined and 
maintained by an external system, the post-industrial world replaced any internal sense of self 
with servitude to the system through the dual false promises of affluence and personal liberty.  
Dedicated to permanent liberal-capitalist progress (because it is through progress 
that the capitalist machine permanently functions and expresses the economic freedom of 
the individual), the modern period is defined by Marcuse as the “mechanization and 
standardization of life”; effectively, the cementing of the historical moment, the perceived 
end of historical progress.22 Here Marcuse suggests that the State maintains control by 
appearing to function at the height, or end, of progress. Potentially transformative, the 
attachment to a progress promised by an external authority, the State, causes people to 
tolerate related notions that seem to comfort and secure. In and of itself, this is not 
absolutely problematic. But, when it begins to operate according to external structures and 
systems of economic control, the comfort and security felt within a progress-based society 
ultimately create the conditions for a tolerance that represses.  
Yet the actual manifestations of repression remain veiled (at least in the collective 
consciousness) behind the liberal promise of economic and individual liberty for all. This 
dedication to common values allows an exploitative State and economic institutions to 
continue to display a great deal of real diversity. Returning to Obama, if we politically and 
socially accept those who adhere to “our common values,” then the system is available to 
all. Yet the consequences of this veiled system of repression are endless. By appearing to 
tolerate diversity and a degree of minority opinions and positions (as long as the general 
liberal values remain apparent), the post-industrial society is able to propagate violence and 
repression while actually exhibiting real diversity – thus suggesting a repressive tolerance 
more totalitarian in application. 
 
A Conflicting Narrative: (“Non”-Repressive) Tolerance 
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If liberal polities legitimate the extended use of State and economic power as long 
as it secures the safety and comfort of the tolerated (and tolerating) masses, liberal 
tolerance both secures diversity and negates non-adherents. For politicians seeking to 
justify the affects of war, economic hierarchies, and entrenched systems of power and 
control, tolerance makes, quoting Marcuse, “compulsory behavior with respect to 
established policies” by moving “from practice to non-practice,”23 from progressive 
inclusion and growth, to entrenched notions of control and power. While Marcuse’s 
argument derives from an analysis of nuclear war, police action against subversive student 
movements, and the fight against communism, it corresponds strongly with the modern 
fight for freedom, the spread of democracy, and wars against terror when he states 
“violence and suppression are promulgated, practiced, and defended by democratic and 
authoritarian governments alike, and the people subjected to these governments are 
educated to sustain such practices as necessary for the preservation of the status quo.”24  
Here, Marcuse references a key relationship between the maintenance of the status 
quo and education. The bridge between maintaining hegemonic normalcy and pursuing 
ends that may not serve the interests of a nation is secured through an educational system 
that highlights the success of tolerance, i.e. Civil Rights, Women’s rights, LGBT 
movement, and emphasizes how tolerance toward the political machine helps secure the 
common end. Americans learn to accept the political model as a set, embedded institution 
that includes various groups, but labels radical movements of change as intolerable because 
such groups may challenge the accepted values of the nation. In such a liberalized context, 
tolerance becomes the socio-cultural force needed to legitimate repressive political action. 
Dissent thus transforms into mere rhetoric exactly because the liberal world demands 
tolerance; tolerance no longer exists as a viable solution for procuring concrete, social 
transformation that moves beyond token gestures of inclusion. And, more importantly, 
when this transformation cannot be completed through incorporation, the State silences (in-
tolerates) dissent by dehumanizing and depoliticizing the former subject.25 
As a result, liberal tolerance equates with repression, negating any notion of 
experimental or autonomous engagement. For the individual agent, tolerance leads to a 
cascade of expectations that fundamentally define and limit an active citizenry to “support” 
the State and its course of action. Issues arise when this leads to the imprisonment and 
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torture of “suspects” in the name of certain basic American values or when basic human 
rights are denied domestically and internationally in the name of a national cause.26 The 
average citizen tolerates pictures and stories of torture and false imprisonment abroad27 and 
homelessness and vast inequalities28 domestically because tolerance toward state-sponsored 
activities is expected of an engaged and liberal citizenry. Viewed critically, this all-
endorsing tolerance provides a sense of legitimacy to the State’s extension into extra-legal 
forms of violence. In these moments, the dichotomy of the citizen (those who adhere to the 
State’s values) vs. non-citizens (those who challenge the State’s values) becomes solely the 
decision of the State. Seen here as an inclusive concept definitionally, tolerance becomes 
the means for exclusion pragmatically. Consequently, when Agamben describes the 
subjective reality of a suspended citizen (one dictated as outside the tolerance and rights of 
the State), he describes a subject “who may be killed and yet not sacrificed.”29  
In such an analysis, according to Marcuse, “tolerance is extended to policies, 
conditions, and modes of behavior which should not be tolerated because they are 
impeding, if not destroying, the chances of creating an existence without fear and 
misery.”30 By recognizing the relationship between tolerance and actual liberal policies, 
Marcuse discerns how society negates the opportunity to seek out and realize different 
social ends by equivocating tolerance with policies and ideals created out a national sense 
of fear. Fear becomes an essential motivating force enabling the State to coerce and control 
the actions and even mindsets of the citizenry – by identifying the excluded “other,” the 
State both increases its perceived commitment to liberal tolerance and cements the 
exclusionary nature of tolerance and the resulting differentiation of power and claims to 
violence. Functionally, tolerance motivates political actors into consensually-subjected 
positions, which in turn legitimizes the actions and directions of the State. In such a liberal 
context, tolerance becomes a means to an end: the ability to mobilize a country to pursue 
goals that may be distinct, and often contradictory, to the proclaimed values inherent to that 
country. 
 
Politics of Inclusion (?): Deliberative Practices, Tolerance and Systems of Power 
Modern American tolerance has consequentially lost its way, and in the process, 
wars, domestically and internationally, are pursued and legitimated through a process of 
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tolerance. The West no longer associates tolerance solely with diverse lifestyles, but rather 
with the dictums of the liberal machine, trapping the subject and “former” subject within a 
system outside individual control – an entrapment both physical and mental. In this system, 
Marcuse asserts, “a mentality is created for which right and wrong, true and false are 
predefined wherever they affect the vital interests of the society.”31 Marcuse interprets 
liberal tolerance as a mechanism the State uses to define and narrow values, participation 
and political acceptance. By predefining the language of the system, “the avenues of 
entrance are closed to the meaning of words and ideas other than the established one,”32 
conclusively disengaging meaningful dissent aimed at transformation by sublimating (or 
eliminating) it into the system. Nowhere is this more evident than in the modern 
deliberative democracy movements,33 where inclusive policies seek to overcome power 
structures and majoritarian policies that may contradict the voice of the citizenry.34 Yet 
purely deliberative practices fail to recognize, as Marcuse points out, that such meetings are 
fixed in time and place.35 Those challenging the dominant values fail to procure change 
because the system denies the space for truly progressive politics of transformation, 
replacing these spaces and moments of transformation with acts of inclusion in order to 
maintain the status quo while cultivating an image of an all-encompassing, tolerance-based 
socio-political system.   
By definition, deliberative democracy requires tolerance; it necessitates an avenue 
for the dissenting voice without necessarily empowering that voice. When such an avenue 
exists within the modes of language, systems of power, and entrenched hierarchies that 
define the nature of the engagement, true inclusion becomes a farce, and the voice of 
dissent becomes a whisper, lost amongst false premises and conceptualizations of public 
tolerance. In an analysis of activist action versus deliberative politics, Iris Marion Young 
demonstrates the inadequacies of a purely deliberative process: in a society “structured by 
deep social and economic inequalities […] formally inclusive deliberative processes 
nevertheless enact structural biases in which more powerful and socially advantaged actors 
have greater access to the deliberative process and therefore are able to dominate the 
proceedings with their interests and perspectives.”36  
In Young’s analysis, deliberative processes in practice fail to recognize that 
inclusionary procedures in themselves do not respond to real hierarchical structures that 
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empower, limit and exploit. However, because the structure of inclusion exists, an illusion 
of real and full democratic decision-making pervades a people, allowing those in power (a 
position derived from the sovereign capacity to define the nature of deliberative practices) 
to operate according to, and potentially beyond, inclusion and tolerance. As a result, the 
State secures unabridged legitimacy to pursue legal and extralegal policies under the guise 
that all voices have been heard (tolerance), the process produced a desired end and course 
of action (State now legitimized to use power and force to protect values), and the policy 
must be supported by the system due to the process (tolerance of the system/tolerance of 
the result).  
In the name of tolerance, the dissenter becomes part of the system, allowing the 
State to pursue actions that expect the tolerance of the people, thus producing an endless 
circle of approval, regardless of the outcomes. In moments of extreme emergency, when 
incorporation is perceived as too limited a solution, the process of tolerance permits the 
State to move into unregulated boundaries of action to protect its vital interests and 
citizenry. An analysis of the state of exception leads Agamben to define these moments “as 
the establishment, by means of the state of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the 
physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens 
who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system.”37 How else could we 
ignore (and as a result, tacitly legitimate) Abu Ghraib and the stories that emanate from 
Guantanamo? The answer lies in the modern, liberal use of tolerance: these instances and 
other images of violence are necessary (and should therefore be tolerated) in order to secure 
“our safety,” pursue the “war on terror,” and spread “freedom” and “democracy” 
throughout the world. By using language sincere to the hearts of Americans, the Bush 
administration created an environment that used objective stories, coupled with subjective 
reasoning, to produce a mission supported by its citizenry. The “enemy combatant,” 
“terrorist” or any designated “other” become a referent for understanding the paradoxical 
nature of a liberal tolerance which includes/excludes, empowers/limits and, most 
importantly, dictates the accepted citizen and the excluded, dehumanized non-citizen.  
Yet events throughout the “liberal world” do not solely indicate a blind adherence to 
liberal tolerance. The election of Barack Obama (which is not without its critics), the 
greater and more frequent expressions of dissent aimed against the Iraq War, and other 
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signs of liberal-capitalism illustrate a growing resolve to deny the interchangeability of 
liberalism and tolerance and search out new means of existence.38 Engaging Marcuse’s 
understanding of a reversed repressive tolerance helps shed light on the exacting nature of 
liberal tolerance and the difficulty of challenging tolerance as an ideal.  
 
Praxis of Reversal: Liberation through Repressive Tolerance  
For Marcuse, tolerance must extend beyond the reification of liberal action and 
values. In his analysis, tolerance can, and should, perpetuate spheres for subversion and 
dissent that challenge the continuation of entrenched systems of power and repression, thus 
providing space for liberation and personal exploration. In its liberal-capitalist 
manifestation, liberal tolerance emerged as the definitional principle of governance used to 
secure policy acceptance, resulting in the perpetuation of exclusionary practices. The 
modern neoconservative movement embodied by the Bush administration established 
negative practices that effectively ignored issues domestically and destroyed basic human 
rights internationally. Based on the often unfounded perception of vital threats against the 
safety of liberal values, recent politics, from preemptive military strikes to the expansion of 
torture techniques, demonstrate how tolerance for State action allows the State to expand 
into unregulated zones of action. These extralegal moments represent a split from the 
consent-based model of democratic practices, but find legitimacy in both the real and tacit 
acceptance of a body politic.  
In an analysis of Guantanamo Bay and its resulting restriction of political identity 
and dehumanization of the intolerable other, Butler describes how  
“in the name of a security alert and national emergency, the law is effectively 
suspended in both its national and international forms. And with the suspension of 
law comes a new exercise of state sovereignty, one that not only takes place outside 
the law, but through an elaboration of administrative bureaucracies in which 
officials now not only decide who will be tried, and who will be detained, but also 
have ultimate say whether someone may be detained indefinitely or not.”39  
With unlimited access to power and violence, the State operates through exclusionary 
principles, highlighting a duality of “protecting” a citizenry while essentially negating the 
voice of the citizen. Once tolerance loses its true focus, it becomes a political weapon for 
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deciding the level and practice of political rights. As Butler warns, this ability to decide the 
nature of the “political life” (what it is and who it belongs to) bestows ultimate power on 
the State in deciding the actual nature of living: “some lives are grievable, and others are 
not; the differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and must 
be grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and maintain certain 
exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human.”40 If the State assumes a monopoly 
on deciding the nature and extent of political inclusion, then tolerance, within a liberal-
capitalist setting, fundamentally challenges the ideal, emancipatory nature of tolerance and 
determines categories of existence. Regaining the promise of tolerance and the ability to 
move forward with a progressive society that empowers the individual, demands, according 
to Marcuse, repressive tolerance aimed at the State or structures of power.  
In 1965, Marcuse wrote, “liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against 
movements from the Right, and toleration of movements from the Left.”41 While mired in 
ideological debates over the nature of Western politics and society, Marcuse’s critique 
ultimately recognizes the ways in which liberal politics, regardless of being practiced by the 
Right or Left, necessarily repress and exclude. In less ideological terms, Marcuse 
understands tolerance to mean the continual, non-repressive process for finding answers 
and courses of action outside liberal politics that seek to radically redefine what it means to 
be a democracy and a subject both nationally and internationally.  
Rational, inclusive discussions limit the available ends, making actual intolerance 
toward prevailing systems of entrenched power potentially necessary. For Marcuse, 
tolerance would mean moving beyond the status quo by eliminating its traditional meaning 
(the interchangeability of tolerance and liberalism) and instituting a system of tolerance that 
challenges the capacity of the current status quo to blind and repress the true interests and 
values of the American people. Marcuse’s essay then represents more than a simple attack 
on the modern meaning of tolerance; it demonstrates a concerted attempt to challenge the 
hegemony of liberal practices. Alone, traditional liberal politics can never provide an all-
encompassing answer or maintain inclusionary principles that do not simultaneously 
exclude. In order to respond to this process of political and subjective imprisonment, an 
active citizenry must be willing to step outside the bounds of tolerable actions to engage 
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with new, non-liberal based understandings of tolerance that attempt to establish more 
communal and humanist projects.  
Recognizing the repressive expansion of liberal-capitalist projects, Marcuse directly 
challenges the nature of modern tolerance: “when tolerance mainly serves the protection 
and preservation of a repressive society, when it serves to neutralize opposition and to 
render men immune against other and better forms of life, then tolerance has been 
perverted.”42 Once perverted, tolerance loses its latent progressivism and its ability to 
challenge destructive ends. Once established as the operational ethos, Marcuse contends, 
perverted tolerance can only be undone by intolerance toward that very system. In a 
reversal of praxis, the emancipatory and non-exclusionary, inclusionary nature of tolerance 
become practical realities only if the repressive characteristic of liberal tolerance is itself 
repressed. For Marcuse, this intolerance begins by removing the false consciousness of 
tolerance that pervades the American system and mind, by relearning to “think in the 
opposite direction” in order to escape the tendency of placing “the facts into the 
predominant framework of values.”43 The hierarchical structure of society uses tolerance to 
include the voice of dissent in order to disempower movements of radical change. Change 
becomes a concrete possibility when the systems and structures of a repressive State are 
challenged at the core, and the dissenting voice becomes not only tolerated, but tolerated as 
a movement to re-engage democratic idealism and tolerance in the modern age. 
 In an analysis of Locke, Michael Walzer writes, “any individual citizen, oppressed 
by the rulers of the state, has a right to disobey their commands, break their laws, even 
rebel and seek to replace rulers and change the laws” due to that very oppression.44 Distinct 
from the exclusionary/inclusionary definition of tolerance derived from his theory of 
liberalism, Locke strongly declares that an unjust government “may be questioned, 
opposed, and resisted, [if it] use[s] unjust force.”45 Relying ultimately on a conceptual 
social contract, Locke argues for a socialized subject (one capable of operating in a 
liberalized context) and a subject who must act to protect the truly progressive nature of a 
democratically-organized society.  
It is this great democratic tradition that makes Marcuse’s essay as relevant today as 
it was in 1965. In the modern American setting, politicians pursue and achieve ends distinct 
from its democratic ideals and promises by engaging and advocating a system of inclusive 
 15 
tolerance that promotes entrenched systems of power at the cost of progressive change. To 
reinvigorate the progressive passions and ideals of the citizenry, tolerance must be seen for 
what it is and the promises it holds. The concept of progressive tolerance within a 
democratic polity necessitates, according to Marcuse, the “practice of discriminating 
tolerance in an inverse direction […] tolerance would be restricted with respect to 
movements of demonstrably aggressive or destructive character.”46 Never an end in itself, 
repressive tolerance seeks to regain the strength of American democracy: “the alternative to 
the established semi-democratic process is not dictatorship or elite, no matter how 
intellectual and intelligent, but the struggle for a real democracy […] part of this struggle is 
the fight against an ideology of tolerance which, in reality, favors and fortifies the 
conservation of the status quo of inequality and discrimination.”47  
 
Aggressive Liberation: The Problem with Repressive Tolerance 
However, Marcuse is not without his own faults and critiques. By advocating 
repressive policies, Marcuse runs the risk of obscuring his own message. In his earlier 
works, Marcuse highlights the possibility for Eros, play and aesthetics to define societal 
and political structures. Key to the development of real liberation, these Marcusian values 
respond against the hyper-mechanization of the post-industrial world and the repressive 
physical and psychological practices of the State. Yet by contrasting these values with 
essays and polemics aimed at repressive action, Marcuse fails to recognize the exacting 
relationship between ideal, humanist-based principles for existence and violent action. Can 
violence procure peaceful existence? And in what ways does repressive tolerance help the 
individual arise out of the liberal malaise and into communally-based, primary narcissism? 
More pragmatically, at what point does reverse repression simply mimic or replicate 
the repressive character of liberal tolerance? Can repressive tolerance ever secure change 
without violent revolution? Placed in its unique historical context, the dormant violence of 
Marcuse’s work becomes evident when connected ahistorically to, taking but one example, 
the vision of Vladimir Lenin’s revolutionary fervor: “But what is forgotten or glossed over 
is this: if the state is the product of the irreconcilable character of class antagonisms, if it is 
a force standing above society and ‘increasingly separating itself from it,’ then it is clear 
that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, 
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but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power, which was created by the 
ruling class and in which this ‘separating’ is embodied.”48 While Lenin’s Marxian 
perspective derives from an analysis of class antagonisms, his call for direct and violent 
engagement with a State apparatus that functions above society equates with Marcuse’s 
critique of liberal practices. While Lenin’s “dictatorship of the proletarian” can be debated, 
his emphasis on establishing a vanguard party that functions outside the repressed class 
fails, much like Marcuse’ emphasis on repression, to recognize the violent and repetitive 
character of new models of hierarchy. Can one model of hierarchy replace another without 
replicating basic, negative characteristics, namely systems of entrenched power and claims 
to violence that perverted tolerance to begin with? 
Viewed historically, as the 1960s bear out, a shift from working within the system 
to direct, violent clashes with the State helped obscure the emancipatory and transcendent 
nature of 1960s radicalism.49 Rather than creating zones of real tolerance, the repressive 
tolerance of 1960s radicals was met with greater intolerance from the State. The battle 
essentially changed from one of values, to asserting dominance and control. Yet even this 
narrative is not clean, and it would be ill-conceived to limit the perceived end of the 1960s 
to a faulty shift into violence. Indeed, the shift to violence by 1960s radicals was not 
absolute, and represented but one effort in a myriad of efforts to change the system. As 
Marcuse’s analysis develops, repressive tolerance in practice can never exist in perpetuity, 
but arises from within the collective voice of a people unwilling to remain within a 
repressive system buttressed by the interchangeability of liberal values and tolerance. Even 
if we accept that Marcuse’s repressive tolerance exists only in relation to State repression 
and ideally dissipates as State repression dissolves, it remains unclear how tolerance can 
regain its progressive nature without consistently resorting to exclusionary practices and 
repression. 
 
From Tolerance to Repression and Back 
While the concept of repressive tolerance may seem distinct to democratic values or 
may result in replicating the repressive system currently in place, the reality lies deeper in 
its true value to democratic processes and ideals. In practice, tolerance becomes a socio-
political tool needed to pursue progressive ends and ideals. A purely liberal tolerance that 
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leads to the maintenance of the status quo and entrenched systems of power misses the 
point; tolerance means accepting the distinct views of a multicultural society while 
pursuing practices that realize the grand promises and utopic quality of the American 
project. It cannot, nor should not, function as a way to justify hierarchical systems or 
processes of inclusion and exclusion. If necessary, repressive tolerance conceivably 
provides the modern political agent with an approach for challenging and overcoming the 
current system in order to seek a new end; it means recognizing repressive systems of 
power as illegitimate and therefore something that cannot be ipso facto tolerated.  
The goal as Marcuse concludes is “universal tolerance […] practiced by the rulers 
as well as the ruled, the lords as well as by the peasants, by the sheriffs as well as their 
victims.”50 In its current manifestation, liberal tolerance ignores entrenched systems of 
power and structural inequalities by relegating the scope of tolerance to the State; by 
controlling the extent of tolerance, the State ultimately controls the mechanisms that 
promise and protect political life. Marcuse’s shift into repressive tolerance does not arise 
solely to destroy the State, but to challenge the restricted liberal definition of tolerance in 
order to make tolerance a universal principle that negates the capacity of the State or 
specific individuals or institutions to repress. In the end, if the status quo use of liberal 
tolerance leads to repression and destruction, then liberal tolerance should be withdrawn, 
and repressive tolerance, with the goal of realizing democratic ideals and universal 
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